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Plaintiffs/Petitioners respectfully submit their Petition for
a Re-Hearing of the above appeal.

In so doing, Plaintiffs certify

that the Petition is presented in good faith, and not for purposes
of delay, and in support of such certification note that two
Justices of the Utah Supreme Court dissented from the majority
opinion set forth in Duncan v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., No.
900233 (Utah April 6, 1992).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT HAS OVERLOOKED OR MISAPPREHENDED
ISSUES RAISED WITH RESPECT TO THE IMMUNITY
OF UDOT.
A.

Decisions as to Warning Devices at Railroad Crossings Are
Not the Exercise of a "Governmental Function''.

As both Judge Stewart's dissenting opinion and Judge Jackson's
concurrence in the Court of Appeals decision recognize, a decision
on whether or not the State is immune initially hinges on whether
or not the governmental activity constitutes the exercise of a
governmental function.

Under Standifordf the decision as to type

of warning device at a railroad crossing is not the exercise of a
governmental function, and no immunity exists regardless of whether
or not such a duty is discretionary or operational.

1

Traditionally, and in accord with a long line of Utah Supreme
Court opinions, commencing with English v. Union Pacific Co.f 45 P.
1

1980).

Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp,r 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah

47 (Utah 1896), the duty to place warning devices at railroad
crossings has been borne by the railroad.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 54-4-15, et seq.,

Only with the passage of

was that responsibility assumed

by the State, and even then, it was an obligation shared with the
railroad, and more recently, the federal government. See, §§ 54-415.3 and 56-1-11 and 45 U.S.C. §§ 433 and 434.
Standifordr

the

fact

the

railroad

has

Consistent with

historically

assumed

responsibilities for warning devices at railway crossings shows
this is not the exercise of "governmental function".
Standiford also enunciated the standards of interpretation to
be applied

in determining

what

is or is not

a

"governmental

function".

"The Act itself considerably broadens the extent of

governmental tort liability", such that an activity is immune only
if it "is of such a unique nature that it can only be performed by
a governmental agency or that it is essential to the core of
governmental

activity".

Id.

at

1232 and

1235, respectively.

Bearing in mind the important, perhaps revolutionary, principles
which Standiford announced, the majority's reliance upon Valasquez
v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 469 P.2d 5 (Utah 1970) appears
erroneous.
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B.

Even if the Exercise of a "Governmental Function". a

Decision as to warning Devices at a Railroad Crossing Are
Not the Exercise of a "Discretionary Function",
In finding that UDOT's operations meet the four-step test for
a discretionary function, as outlined in Little v. Utah State
Division of Family Services, 667 P. 2d 49 (Utah 1983), the majority
overlooks in two very important respects precisely what UDOT does
in

determining

devices.

whether

a

crossing

deserves

upgraded

warning

In particular, UDOT does not, in reality, exercise a

"basic policy evaluation judgment and expertise" in prioritizing
crossings.

Instead, our record is replete with testimony and other

evidence from members of UDOT's own surveillance teams to the
effect that a rigid mathematical formula is applied in prioritizing
crossings.

For a more extensive discussion of UDOT's

index, see, generally, Appellant's brief at Pages 7-9.

"hazard
Further,

UDOT acts in wholesale accord with the standards established in the
Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices, portions of which are
appended to Union Pacific's Brief.
It is the mechanical formula utilized in our instance which
distinguishes UDOT's duties from those at issue in Rocky Mountain
Thrift v. Salt Lake Cityr 789 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989), as relied upon
by the majority.
measuring

The design of a drainage system is nothing like

crossing

angles,

train

3

and

automobile

speed

and

automobile and train volume, or calculating predicted

accident

rates.
Even assuming the decision on whether to upgrade a crossing is
the exercise of "discretionary function", the majority overlooks
what actually occurred on our facts.

Here, UDOT had re-evaluated

the Drubey Road crossing in November of 1981, and the surveillance
team recommended installation of automatic crossing signals.

UDOT

simply and tragically failed to implement this decision until after
the

fatal

Duncan

accident.

As

Justice

Stewart

so

cogently

observes, "implementation of a policy decision is an operational,
not a discretionary, act, and, as such, is undeserving of the
discretionary function protection".

Slip Opinion at 13.

Citing,

Doe v. Arguelles, 716 P.2d 279, 282 (Utah 1985) and, importantly,
Bigelow v. Ingersollr 618 P.2d 50 (Utah 1980), involving the design
of a traffic control system.
In view of this Court's recent pronouncements on discretionary
function immunity, many of which involve highway or intersection
warning signs, the majority's opinion appears to grossly overstate
the precedential value of Valasquez. First, Valasquez predates the
public policy considerations espoused in Standiford, that being a
restriction

of

immunity

and

expansion

of

liability.

While

Standiford was admittedly not a "discretionary function" immunity

4

case, the policies there announced represent a departure from those
applied in Valasquez.
The majority's attempts to distinguish Valasquez as to the
exercise of a "discretionary function" from the trio of subsequent
findings in Bigelowf Bowen and Richards overlooks the Court's own
language in the more recent opinions. Particularly noteworthy here
is the language of the unanimous court in Richards v. Leavittf 716
P.2d 276 (Utah 1985).

As recognized by Justices Stewart and Durham

at Page 13 but ignored by the majority at Page 6, the installation
of warning devices at a railroad crossing are clearly not the
exercise of a discretionary function.
In Bigelow v. Ingersoll [citation omitted],
where the plaintiff sued the governmental
entity for the negligent design, construction
and maintenance of a traffic light which
caused their injuries, the state argued that
the activity
involved
the
discretionary
function accepted from the waiver of immunity
under U.C.A., 1953, §63-30-10(1). This quote
supported the plaintiff's posture that that
section did not modify the waiver of immunity
governed by §63-30-8 and that the activities
complained of did not involve decisions made
at the basic plan-making level so as to render
the state immune from suit.
716 P.2d 278.

These petitioners must, once again, respectfully

urge that under the discretionary function analysis consistently
applied by this Court subsequent to the outdated Valasquez holding,

5

the state of Utah is not immune for any negligence incident to the
conditions created at the Drubey Road crossing.
C.

2

The Majority Does Not Address Whether Piscretionary
Function Immunity Modifies the Waiver of Immunity under

§ 63-3Q-8,
An

issue

raised

by

Plaintiffs/Petitioners

but

not

even

addressed in the majority opinion is whether discretionary function
immunity supersedes or can modify the wholesale immunity waiver set
forth at 63-30-8 which provides:
immunity
from suit of all
governmental
entities is waived for any injury caused by a
defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of
any highway, road, street, alley, crosswalk,
sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct or
other structure located thereon.
As the above quote from Leavitt clearly states, discretionary
function immunity does not affect or supplant the legislatures
specific pronouncement that no immunity exists for dangerous road
conditions,

a

phrase

sufficiently

broad

enough

to

encompass

hazardous railway crossings.

2

Yet another case recently rejecting discretionary function
immunity for decisions as to railroad crossing device upgrades is
Arm jo v. Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co.r 754 F. Supp. 1526
(D.N.M. 1990) and cases at 1533.

6

The Supreme Court's oversight

in failing to make even a

passing reference to this seemingly "on point" statute warrants a
rehearing and a ruling in favor of Plaintiffs.

3

POINT II.
THE MAJORITY OPINION OVERLOOKS THE CUMULATIVE
AFFECT OF ITS RULING AND THE REJECTION OF RECOGNIZED
PUBLIC POLICY CONCERNS IT EFFECTUATES.
As Justices Stewart and Durham's dissent notes, the current
"result unjustly denies recovery to the Plaintiffs in this case and
to all future plaintiffs who find themselves similarly situated".
Slip Opinion at 18.

While there are admittedly a few occasions

where a plaintiff may be denied a recourse to the courts for
negligently

caused

injuries,

in

general,

the

principle

runs

contrary to laudatory tort theories and public policy concerns such
as compensating parties injured through no fault of their own and
deterring

hazardous

conditions

by

responsible for blameworthy conduct.

holding

negligent

entities

The majority's failure to

address, whatsoever, these important issues demands a rehearing.
Consistent

with

sound

policy

considerations

behind

the

Governmental Immunity Act, this Court's recent opinions reveal an
evolutionary process of upholding victims rights to recover while
holding the state liable for dangerous conditions it helps create.
3

Interestingly enough, Valasquez does cite to 63-30-8 yet it
also fails to resolve the apparent inconsistency between the two
sections of the governmental immunity act.
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See, generally. Condamarin v. University Hospital. 775 P.2d 348
(Utah 1989).
At

the

same

time,

this

Court

relieved

railroads

from

traditional duties to answer for damages arising out of hazardous
railroad crossings.

Those facets of the majority's opinion are

based, in part, on funding concerns.

The state must exercise a

policy decision to allocate scant resources to upgrade warning
signals at crossings and yet Judge Halls1 decision overlooks UDOT's
ability to require the railroad to share in those costs or perhaps
even shoulder the entire burden.

Seef UTAH CODE ANN. § 54-4-15.3.

Lost in all these monetary considerations are the interests of
survivors trying to compensate for the loss of fathers, mothers,
children

and

the

support,

both

emotional

and

financial

they

provide.
This

powerful

reasonable

and

well

court

has

been

supported

legal

presented
arguments

with

numerous,

which

permit

fulfilling the dual purposes of compensation and deterrence.

The

majority's decision overlooks the same.
POINT III,
THIS COURT OVERLOOKED OR MISAPPREHENDED A LARGE
BODY OF LAW UPHOLDING RAILROAD'S DUTIES
AS TO HAZARDOUS CROSSINGS REGARDLESS OF
STATE AUTHORITY.
Without citation to a single opinion definitively addressing
the issue, this Court held that the authority of UDOT to determine
8

the type of warning device to be used at a railroad crossing
superseded any long-standing duty of the railroad to protect the
travelling

public at a crossing.

In doing

so, the majority

overlooked not only precedent from this jurisdiction but statutory
authority as well.
While paying lip service to English v. Southern Pacific,
supra, Justice Hall effectively overturns numerous Utah decisions
imposing a common law duty on a railroad to exercise reasonable and
due

care,

crossings.

including

providing

appropriate

safety

devices

at

See, generally, Bridges v. Union Pacific Railroad, 488

P.2d 738 (Utah 1971) and the excellent discussion of this point at
in Justice Stewart's dissent at Slip Opinion,

Page 15. As Justice

Stewart states, there is absolutely no reason the state's duty
precludes the railroad from having a concurrent duty. Slip Opinion
at 16. Not only is this consistent with prior Utah authority, it
harmonizes applicable statutes as well.
Department of Transportation

Compare § 54-4-15.1 (the

shall provide

for installing and

improving of safety devices at rail crossings) with § 56-1-11
("Railroads shall be liable for damages caused by negligence to
make and maintain good and sufficient crossings.11).
Aside from the vague and inconsistent opinion of the Court of
Appeals in Gleave, no Utah case exists addressing the railroad's
duty of care in the face of UDOT's authority to enhance crossing
9

protection.

What the majority overlooked is a substantial body of

case law from other jurisdictions.

Among those

jurisdictions

upholding a railroad's common law duty of care despite pervasive
state regulatory authority in the field of train warning signals
are:

Florida, Seaboard Coastline Railroad Co. v. LouAllenr 479

So. 2d 781 (Fla. App. 1985); Georgia, Southern Railway Co. v, Kraft.
373 S.E. 2d 774 (Ga. App. 1988); Illinois, Stromquist v. Burlington
Northern, Inc.f 444 N.E.2d 1113 (111. App. 1983); Indiana, Stevens
v. Norfolks and Western Railway Co.r 357 N.E.2d 1 (Ind. App. 1976);
Iowa, Carl v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co.f 880 F.2d 68 (8th
Cir. 1989); Montana, Runkle v. Burlington Northern, 613 P.2d 982
(Mont. 1982); and a case construing New Jersey law, McMinn v.
Consolidated Rail Corp.r 716 F. Supp. 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).

For a

further discussion of these cases and in the interest of brevity,
the Court's attention is directed to Plaintiff/Petitionerfs Brief
at Pages 16 through 19. By contrast to the well-reasoned authority
Petitioners cited, Defendant Railroad was largely unable to produce
anything on this point outside the realm of federal pre-emption
under the Federal Rail Safety Act.

See Union Pacific's brief at

Page 31. 4
4

As the railroad's federal pre-emption argument was not a
basis for the majority's decision and in view of page limitations,
no discussion thereon is contained herein.
For an analysis of
federal pre-emption, please see Petitioner's Reply Brief at Page 7
through 10. Notably, the railroad failed to plead federal pre10

One final argument the majority overlooks was the unworkable
and unrealistic standard of care imposed on the railroad when one
contrasts Gleave with this Court's ruling in Duncan.

In Gleave,

the Court of Appeals continued to uphold a duty of care on the part
of the railroad to, for instance, keep their right-of-way clear of
vegetation or other materials which might obstruct visibility. 749
P.2d 664.

Now, this Court states the railroad has no duty with

respect to warning devices.
distinguishing

between

It is respectfully submitted that

warning

issues

and

visibility

issues,

particularly in view of the duties imposed upon the railroad to
"make and maintain good and sufficient crossings", is a standard
difficult for trial courts and counsel to apply.
CONCLUSION
As Justices Stewart and Durham's well-reasoned dissent points
out, the majority did not fully analyze the many important issues
raised in our circumstances or has overlooked or misapprehended
legal

authority

and

public

policy

concerns.

On

that basis,

Petitioners seek a rehearing of this appeal so as to enable those
injured or killed at hazardous railway crossings recourse to the
courts to recover damages they are justly entitled to.

emption and consequently has waived this defense.
11

DATED this

22 e

day of May,

Michael A. Katz
PURSER, OKAZAKI & BEI
39 Post Office Place #300
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-2104
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/
Petitioners
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